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Abstract
Insurance is critical to the fabric of modern societies and economies, but the insurance
industry continues to suffer deep cycles and periodic crises. These have a great socio-
economic cost as insurance cover can become prohibitively expensive or unavailable, dam-
aging livelihoods, property, belongings and employment. These phenomena are poorly
understood. A set of socio-anthropological and behavioral hypotheses have recently been
posited. We investigate these explanations by means of an agent-based simulation model.
The model is parameterized on actual property insurance industry data and is carefully
validated. Our main result is that simple behavior and interaction at the individual level
can result in complex cyclical industry-wide behavior. Heterogeneity and interaction at a
micro level must therefore be understood if cycles and crises in the insurance industry are
to be managed and prevented.
Keywords: Underwriting cycle, Insurance crisis, Theory of Plural Rationalities,
Underwriter, Actuary
1. Introduction
Insurance provides security to billions of people worldwide. It protects their homes, be-
longings and their livelihoods. Insurance organizes and pools risks. It requires individuals
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to come together, contribute premiums to a fund, and it compensates those who encounter
unfortunate events such as fire, accident, theft and natural disasters. Insurance is therefore
a critical part of the social fabric.
The property-casualty (or non-life) insurance industry around the world is known to
experience regular cycles and periods of crises. These are poorly-understood phenomena.
The cycles, known as underwriting cycles by insurance insiders, involve deep swings in
prices and profitability which occur in more or less regular periods of 5–8 years (Har-
rington et al., 2014). These cycles appear to be independent of the general business or
macroeconomic cycle. They are also visible on different insurance product lines and in
different countries, but occur separately and over different time scales. A multi-year cycli-
cal pattern is exhibited in Figure 1 which shows the loss ratio (ratio of total claims paid
to total premiums earned) for the whole of the U.S. property-casualty insurance industry
from 1951 to 2011.
Insurance is a trillion-dollar business and is vital to the health of the economy because it
enables individuals and businesses to operate with a degree of insulation from unpredictable
events. Underwriting cycles can be damaging because unexpectedly high premiums make
insurance unaffordable to ordinary individuals, removing the financial protection that they
require to conduct fulfilling and productive lives. Cycles also affect corporate clients and
damage economically productive activity. The cycles also affect insurers themselves because
low profitability, at some stages of the cycle, drives many insurers to insolvency, affecting
both employees and insurance consumers.
Insurance crises occur when the troughs of the underwriting cycle are particularly deep.
Prices vary over the course of the underwriting cycle, but the very availability of insurance
becomes a sudden and pressing issue in an insurance crisis. Such crises have been reported
regularly over the history of the insurance industry (Stewart et al., 1991). Inexplicably, the
peaks and troughs of the cycles can sometimes be very deep. In the early 2000s, a severe
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Figure 1: Time series plots of annual loss ratio (ratio of total claims paid to total premiums received)
for the whole of the U.S. property-casualty insurance industry. Continuous line: loss ratio. Broken line:
de-trended loss ratio. Source: A.M. Best Company.
contraction in the professional indemnity and medical malpractice insurance area in the
U.S. occurred, with premiums for medical and other health professionals increasing by up
to 60% within a year and leading to the withdrawal of some health services (Harrington
et al., 2008). A particularly severe and widely publicized crisis happened in the mid-1980s
in the U.S. liability insurance industry, when insurance premiums shot up by over 70% in
a year (Winter, 1988), even leading to the closure of many day care centers (Weiss, 2007).
After the 9/11 terror attacks, there was also a significant fall in the supply of commercial
property insurance. Such events clearly have adverse socio-economic consequences.
Theories abound concerning the causes of underwriting cycles, but no single explana-
tion has been satisfactorily provided. In this article, we consider explanations based on
the psychology and behavior of actors in the insurance industry. These explanations are
grouped together under the label of “behavioral hypotheses”. They emphasize the social
interaction between individuals within insurance firms, between insurers across the insur-
ance industry, and between insurers and customers. Without extensive survey data and
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statistics collected across a broad sample of insurance companies and over an extended
period, it is difficult to test these theories fully. At the root of these hypotheses is the
central premise that individual behavior and social interaction at a local level can generate
complex macro-level behavior, such as cycles and crises. The purpose of this paper is to
test this central premise.
The tool that we use to this end is an agent-based simulation model. Agents are
insurers or customers within a particular segment of the insurance industry (property
insurance in the United Kingdom). Customers and insurers are endowed with simple rules
of behavior, and are allowed to be heterogeneous. Interaction and interdependence of
individual customers and insurers mean that the behavior of the social system in which
they participate is qualitatively different from simple individual-level behavior. Complex
behavior, such as cycles and extreme events, can emerge endogenously (Axelrod, 1997;
Macal and North, 2010).
Our main contribution to the literature is to provide evidence that simple behavior by,
and interaction between, heterogeneous individual agents in the insurance industry cannot
be ruled out as a cause of complex systemic behavior such as cycles and crises. In the next
section, we review some of the theories about underwriting cycles and insurance crises,
focusing on socio-anthropological and behavioral hypotheses. We then describe our model,
the insurance industry data which we use, the estimation of various model parameters, and
validation of the model, before discussing our main results.
2. Background and Motivation
2.1. The Insurance Industry
It helps at the outset to describe some of the key roles in an insurance firm. Underwriters
estimate customers’ potential claims (losses) and decide whether to sell policies to them and
at what price. Actuaries collect claim (loss) statistics and use this to calculate premium
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rates for different classes of policyholders. Insurance prices are determined by underwriters
based on market conditions and the premium rates established by actuaries. Loss adjusters
(claims adjusters) decide the value of claims when these are made by customers. Note that
customers may be individual or corporate policyholders. There are also many operations
managers in insurance firms, particularly in Information Technology: they have become
very influential with the development of technologies such as insurance aggregator websites,
telematics, and machine learning using ‘Big Data’.
There are several theories concerning the formation of cycles and the occurrence of crises
in the insurance industry, but none of these theories is accepted as a perfect explanation
for these phenomena. In particular, it remains difficult to forecast the occurrence, and
manage the financial impact, of cycles and crises. A theory that was formulated early
on is that variation in interest rates can explain variation in insurance prices (Doherty
and Kang, 1988).1 Other early hypotheses about underwriting cycles are that irrational
forecasting errors about insurance losses are made by actuaries because they extrapolate
from past data (Venezian, 1985), and that institutional delays in accounting or regulation
trigger oscillatory behavior through a form of lagged feedback (Cummins and Outreville,
1987). These explanations have not been borne out by the data (Harrington et al., 2014).
Two other competing explanations are posited nowadays. The first is that a large
and unexpected industry-wide loss, such as a devastating earthquake in an industrialized
society, catches insurers by surprise causing them collectively to push prices up in a bid
to avoid insolvency (Winter, 1994; Gron, 1994). This does not adequately explain the
sustained down-swing in prices, however. The second hypothesis is that insurers are het-
erogeneous in terms of the quality of their management and forecasting ability (Harrington
1Insurers invest the premiums that they receive in the money and bond markets before making a payout
on a claim, so their profitability will be interest rate-sensitive.
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and Danzon, 1994; Harrington et al., 2008). The worst insurers, often new and inexperi-
enced entrants to the industry, aggressively seek market share, offering low premiums to
attract customers, leading to a “price war” with more established insurers. This explains
the down-swing in prices and profitability, but not the up-swing of the cycle.
2.2. Behavioral and Socio-Anthropological Explanations for Cycles and Crises
The behavioral and socio-anthropological explanations for underwriting cycles that we
consider in this article are most clearly articulated by Fitzpatrick (2004), an insurance
lawyer, and by the actuaries Feldblum (2001), Ingram and Underwood (2010), Ingram et
al. (2012) and Ingram and Bush (2013). These insurance professionals describe a rich social
tapestry of interactions among the participants in the insurance industry.
More recently, Kunreuther et al. (2013), Ligon and Thistle (2007) and Boyer et al.
(2013), have supplied evidence and devised models to test these behavioral hypotheses.
They base their views on the sub-discipline of behavioral economics which recognizes that
economic agents are not fully rational. There is anecdotal evidence that these behavioral
explanations are garnering support and seem to be the composite view of many insiders in
the insurance industry such as at the influential specialist insurance marketplace Lloyd’s of
London (Lloyd’s, 2010) and in regulatory bodies like the UK Financial Conduct Authority
(Erta et al., 2013).
2.3. Fear, Conservatism and Overconfidence
Fitzpatrick (2004) regards fear as a key emotion which drives the behavior of individuals
in the insurance industry, and consequently drives underwriting cycles. (For more about
fear as an emotion, see Tudor (2003).) Underwriters are remunerated by the amount of
business that they generate. They therefore compare themselves to their peers across the
industry. Their fear that they will lose their job or promotion to someone else will dictate
sales and premium growth in the insurance business. This is complicated by the short-term
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incentives which dominate in insurance and the ability of underwriters to move to other
insurance firms well before the impact of any mispricing becomes apparent.
Fear is also one of the major drivers of financial markets, as behavioral economists have
pointed out. Kunreuther et al. (2013) detail a number of ways in which individuals working
for insurers can be irrational and emotion-driven, exhibiting behavioral biases and using
heuristics (rules of thumb). Classical economics assumes that insurance firms, like other
firms in the economy, merely maximize expected profits. However, both Mayers and Smith
(1990) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) have argued that managers within these firms
are essentially risk-averse individuals who are fearful of insolvency and of the consequential
costs to their careers of failure of their firms.2
Kunreuther et al. (2013, p. 151) go further and provide evidence that insurance man-
agers are not just risk-averse, but they are also ambiguity-averse. Ambiguity aversion
means that, when underwriters determine a premium, they focus first on the statistics-
based rates handed down to them by actuaries, but then worry about “unknown unknowns”
and either increase premiums in a potentially irrational way, deepening the underwriting
cycle, or they refuse insurance coverage outright, engendering an insurance crisis. This
can happen particularly in the aftermath of a catastrophic loss. Kunreuther et al. (2013,
p. 174) give explicit examples such as in the pricing of insurance after Hurricane Andrew
in 1992 in the USA. Like Fitzpatrick (2004), Kunreuther et al. (2013) also point out that
underwriters are concerned with their employment if their firms are severely affected by a
large loss, which further contributes to their ambiguity aversion.
Several researchers point out that insurance underwriters are susceptible to periodic
bouts of bullishness and bearishness, which are crowd phenomena. Feldblum (2001) refers
2Managers cannot hedge this risk, unlike stockholders in the firm who can own a diverse portfolio of
stocks.
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to the “mass psychology” of underwriters, who swing between optimism in profitable years
and pessimism in loss-making years. This can not only exacerbate, but also create, cycles in
the insurance industry. Boyer et al. (2013) make this theme even more explicit, comparing
underwriters to stock market traders. They believe that underwriters go through phases
of bearishness where they under-react to a favorable insurance claims experience because
of a conservatism bias, and then phases of bullishness where they over-react because of
the representativeness heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). They show that this can
trigger cycles in the same way that the stock market can go through boom and bust. Ligon
and Thistle (2007) also believe that insurance managers can exhibit overconfidence in their
estimates of insurance losses, and claim that this can create cycles in the industry.
2.4. Social Interaction and Interdependence
One of the key observations of Feldblum (2001) concerns the interaction of individuals
within firms, the interdependence of insurers in the industry, and also the interaction with
customers. He asserts that individuals at the helm of these firms engage in “conjectural
variation”, whereby they are constantly second-guessing how their peers in the industry
will react in terms of pricing, if they themselves adjust their prices up or down. Conjec-
tural variation means that insurers are not merely price-takers. This deviates from the
assumption of a perfectly competitive insurance industry conventionally made in economic
models. Feldblum (2001) claims that there are hidden barriers to entry into the insurance
industry for individual professionals and their insurance firms, and that success involves
a learning curve, experienced underwriting and knowledge of customers. Successful in-
surance professionals know how to exploit the inertia of customer demand: customers do
not react merely to price and will not switch to another insurer as readily as the perfect
competition ideal assumes.
Furthermore, insurance industry executives react to each other, and sometimes exhibit
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herd behavior. An example given by Feldblum (2001) is how, in a situation where price
wars have resulted in persistently unprofitable price cuts, executives will eventually decry
this in trade magazines and conferences. This signals to the whole industry that rising rates
may now be contemplated. It may take just a few market leaders, whose rates are well-
publicized and against which everyone else compares themselves, to raise prices, and every
other insurer then follows suit, confident that their competition are also raising prices.
Fitzpatrick (2004) suggests another way in which social interaction within the insurance
industry surfaces in the form of cycles: there is a continuous shift of bureaucratic power in
an insurance company. Underwriters have the upper hand in profitable times and they push
prices down to maximize sales. Claims adjusters and actuaries are more powerful at times
when the insurer is in financial distress; they vie to raise prices to restore profitability.
This “ebb and flow of bureaucratic influence” (Fitzpatrick, 2004) among the different
departments within an insurance company means that different individuals come to the
fore at different times, when they exercise maximal influence over management decisions.
Insurance companies are ultimately composed of individuals and their judgment affects
pricing decisions and this itself drives the cycles on insurance markets.
2.5. Plural Rationalities
Ingram and Underwood (2010), Ingram et al. (2012) and Ingram and Bush (2013) ex-
tend this argument in a significant way by proposing that the Cultural Theory of Risk can
explain underwriting cycles in the insurance industry. The Cultural Theory, also known as
Theory of Plural Rationalities, originates from the work of Mary Douglas in social anthro-
pology; see Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) and Thompson et al. (1990). Many industry
insiders have been receptive to this idea, notably at Lloyd’s of London (Lloyd’s, 2010).
Rather than the purely rational individual of classical economics, or the plethora of (some-
times contradictory) biases of behavioral economics, this theory postulates that there are
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four types of individuals, based on attitude to risk. Ingram and Underwood (2010), In-
gram et al. (2012) and Ingram and Bush (2013) map these attitudes to insurance functions.
Underwriters are ‘individualists’: they are risk-taking profit-maximizers. Claims adjusters
are ‘egalitarians’: they are risk-averse conservators. Actuaries are ‘authoritarians’: they
are prudent risk managers. Other operations managers (for example in IT departments)
are ‘fatalists’: they are pragmatists.
According to Ingram and Underwood (2010) and Ingram and Bush (2013), when profits
are high, profit-maximizers (underwriters) are influential and they relax underwriting stan-
dards to compete for customers and maximize sales (and their own remuneration). When
profits fall and the firm is distressed, conservators (claims adjusters) take over and require
stricter underwriting standards. Eventually risk managers (actuaries) gain more say as
they help the company restore its finances. At various points, the pragmatists help out,
making alliances to enable the company to keep operating. Eventually, profitability is re-
stored, memory fades, and the profit-maximizers take over again, repeating the cycle. Like
Fitzpatrick (2004), Ingram and Underwood (2010) contend that the interaction between
the different groups in the insurance firm—the to-ing and fro-ing of power—is mirrored
across many insurance companies, and that this drives cycles throughout the insurance
industry.
3. Methodology and Data
The various behavioral hypotheses for cycles and crises in the insurance industry, as
set out in the preceding section, are difficult to test for a number of reasons. First, and
most obviously, this requires a large amount of field and survey data collected at several
insurance companies and over a long period of time. The cycles appear distinct from
one product line to another, which means that longitudinal data would be required about
different individuals working on different products in different companies. Cycles appear
10
to have a period of 5–8 years, so one would require data over decades before amassing
enough evidence, by which time structural and technological changes in the industry would
likely make the earlier data redundant. Second, the theory involves variables which are
difficult to measure, whether quantitatively or qualitatively: the strength of networks,
social influence, fear, power within and among groups, all of which must be estimated both
inside an insurance company and across the industry. Third, the behavioral explanations
involves multiple strands, such as shifting bureaucratic power and conjectural variation,
and distinguishing between these is difficult. Finally, such a test would in fact be a joint
test of the behavioral hypotheses of insurance cycles with one or more other theories, such
as the socio-anthropological theory of plural rationalities or the behavioral economic theory
of ambiguity aversion.
We propose instead to test a counter-proposition, namely that simple individual be-
havior by insurers cannot propagate and emerge as complex cyclical collective behavior
across the industry. The behavioral and socio-anthropological hypotheses of Fitzpatrick
(2004), Feldblum (2001), Ingram and Bush (2013), Kunreuther et al. (2013) and Boyer
et al. (2013), as described in sections 2.2–2.5, all implicitly assume that the behavioral
biases that they ascribe to individuals in the insurance market will not cancel out on av-
erage, but will emerge instead as complex cyclical collective behavior. If simple behavior
of individuals at the level of the firm does not result in industry-wide cycles and crises,
then this negates a central premise of the behavioral hypotheses: there is no transmission
mechanism whereby cycles can occur across the industry because of firm-level behavior.
Of course, the converse is not true. That is, if the agent-based simulation model exhibits
cycles, this does not prove conclusively that individual or firm behavior is the cause (or
indeed the sole cause) of insurance cycles and crises.
Agent-based simulation modeling is an ideal tool to investigate this. Crucially, agent-
based models afford interaction of agents within a social space and enable global behavior
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to emerge which cannot be anticipated from the interaction of these individuals. They
can capture the kind of interdependence and mass psychology postulated by Feldblum
(2001), the behavior of crowds implicit in much of behavioral economics (Kunreuther et
al., 2013), and the interaction of roles and risk types described by Fitzpatrick (2004) and
Ingram and Bush (2013). Furthermore, agent-based models allow for heterogeneity, unlike
classical models of insurance economics. The plurality of risk attitudes and the diversity
of roles which may dominate organizations require heterogeneity. The “winner’s curse”
explanation developed by Harrington and Danzon (1994) and Harrington et al. (2008),
and espoused by Feldblum (2001), also demands that insurers be heterogeneous.
Our use of an agent-based simulation model to investigate the insurance industry is
given greater credibility by the fact that insurance analysts have themselves shown consid-
erable interest recently in the agent-based modelling philosophy (Palin et al., 2008; Mills,
2010; Carter, 2011; Parodi, 2012). An example is Ingram et al. (2012) who construct a toy
model, the “Surprise Game”, which implements a simple version of the Theory of Plural
Rationalities described by Ingram and Underwood (2010) and Ingram and Bush (2013).
There are 30 insurers who are agents and who choose, at each time step, one of the four
risk attitudes, in response to what the other insurers do, in a bid to survive and prosper.
This simple model is not designed to investigate complex behavior such as cycles, but it
does serve the purpose of showing that agent-based bottom-up artificial-society modeling
can afford a richer and more realistic set of economic behaviors in the insurance industry
than classical insurance economic models. In particular, their model is not estimated and
validated on data and serves only as an illustration.
The data which we use to estimate and validate our agent-based model is based on
aggregate data on insurers selling property insurance in the United Kingdom, courtesy of
the Association of British Insurers (ABI). Using data from 1983 to 2011, we calculate the
annual loss ratio for the UK property insurance industry. (The loss ratio is defined as the
12
Figure 2: Loss ratios for the UK property insurance industry. Source: Association of British Insurers.
ratio of total claims paid to total premiums earned.) Figure 2 shows a time plot of the
loss ratio. Notice that, as in Figure 1, troughs and crests appear in Figure 2 indicating a
cycle. We work with the loss ratio rather than total premium because, over several years,
premiums increase with inflation, making the identification of cycles difficult.3
4. Model Description and Parameterization
4.1. Preference Landscape and Agent Attributes
Our agent-based model of UK property insurance can be described as follows. There
is a fixed number (M) of customers who must buy property insurance at the beginning of
every year from one of a fixed number (N) of insurers.4 Customers make random claims at
3Since the loss ratio is a ratio of two monetary quantities, inflation is canceled out (assuming that
inflation affects claims and premiums in a similar fashion). The loss ratio is usually stationary around
a linear trend, as is visible in Figure 1. The linear trend is usually ascribed to decades-long structural
change in the insurance industry caused by technological innovation, regulations, or changes in labor costs
(Harrington et al., 2014).
4For simplicity, inflation, tax, expenses and fraud are ignored in the model.
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Figure 3: A circular simulation landscape showing eight insurers and a large number of customers uniformly
distributed along the circle. The proximity of a customer to an insurer signifies greater affinity for the
insurer and his product.
the end of the year, independently of each other.5 Insurers and customers are autonomous
and self-directed agents in the model and are located on an abstract circular simulation
landscape, as shown in Figure 3. The insurer’s location on the circle denotes a particular
set of attributes: perceived reliability, advertising methods, branding, target demographics,
distribution channels, payment methods, perceived efficiency of claims service etc. The
proximity of a customer to an insurer is interpreted as a greater affinity for the insurer and
his product. Insurers and customers are fixed in the circular space so that their attributes
and preferences do not change.
The differing locations of insurers means that they are heterogeneous. This is in line
5 The UK very rarely experiences natural catastrophes that damage UK property with such severity
that the insurance market faces large-scale industry-wide losses which could periodically trigger cycles.
The assumption of statistical independence of individual claims is therefore reasonable.
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with the price-cutting model of Harrington et al. (2008). It also means that insurance
products are not identical and directly substitutable. The insurance industry is therefore
competitive, but not perfectly so, in line with the views of Feldblum (2001).6 The topology
of a circular preference landscape is, of course, common to many agent-based models: see
for example Gulya´s (2002), as well as the work of Ladley (2013) on contagion effects in
the banking industry. We choose it here for its simplicity. The circular landscape has
also been used previously in insurance in the simple game theoretic model of Schlesinger
and Schulenburg (1991) to investigate the effect of search and switching costs incurred by
customers.
A final attribute of insurers is that they have a certain level of wealth or capital which
changes over time as they sell more or less policies. A useful strategy, to achieve greater
heterogeneity, is to endow each insurer with a random amount of capital (Gulya´s, 2002),
but the choice of a suitable distribution is then arbitrary, so we elect to initialize the model
with all insurers having the same amount of capital. Simulation experiments indicate that
this makes little difference in the long run.7
4.2. Insurer’s Pricing Decision Rule
At the beginning of every year, every insurer offers a single price to all customers.8
At time t, insurer i computes the price Pit through a two-stage process. The first stage
involves the actuary and the second stage involves the underwriter. In our model, the
actuary follows the usual actuarial costing or rate-making methods, as set out by Kaas
et al. (2008, p. 203–227), Booth et al. (2005, p. 439) and Hart et al. (2007, p. 213) for
6Property insurance contracts may be identical but the total insurance product package (comprised of
the contract as well as branding, perceived reliability of insurer, distribution channels etc.) will not be
identical and interchangeable.
7We discard the first 100 simulation periods to avoid initialization effects.
8This can be viewed as a price per unit of risk. See for example Taylor (2008).
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example. The actuary first calculates a pure premium P˜it. The pure premium represents
the insurer’s expected claim cost in the following year. It is a weighted average of the
insurer’s own average past claims and the average industry-wide claim in the past year.
This weighted average involves a “credibility factor” or weighting parameter z (where 0 <
z < 1). The larger z is, the greater the weight placed by the actuary on the insurer’s own
claim experience. Actuaries throughout the industry pool claims data at rating bureaus
or advisory organizations such as the Insurance Services Office in the U.S., hence the use
of the average industry-wide claim in the above. The average past claims of the insurer is
itself usually an exponentially weighted moving average of past claims, giving more weight
(according to a parameter w) to claims in the recent past than in the distant past.
Finally, the actuary calculates an actuarial premium rate P˜it + αFit. The term αFit is
known as a risk loading, with α being a loading factor (α > 0) and Fit representing some
measure of risk or volatility of claims experienced by insurer i in the year (t − 1, t). In
our model, Fit is the standard deviation of claims in the year (t − 1, t), consistent with
actuarial statistics (Kaas et al., 2008, p. 119) and actuarial practice (Hart et al., 2007,
p. 170). Thus, a riskier claims experience leads to a higher premium rate calculated by the
actuary.9
In the second stage, the actuary passes his premium rate to the underwriter who adjusts






This adjustment involves a mark-up mit, which depends on the underwriter’s evaluation
9 The actuarial rate-making procedure is considerably simplified here, but its essence is nevertheless
captured. For more details about actuarial premium principles, credibility estimates, risk classification,
and the computations required in insurance mathematics, see Kaas et al. (2008) or Booth et al. (2005) or
Hart et al. (2007), among other standard insurance texts.
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of customers’ sensitivity to the price of the insurance product. We follow Hirschey and
Pappas (1996, p. 639) and assume that the underwriter calculates an arc price-elasticity
of demand from the quantities of contracts sold in the previous two years and the prices
at which they were sold. This gives a crude estimate of the mark-up m̂it. Underwriters do
not want prices to change too rapidly as this could alienate customers, so they calculate a
final mark-up mit by updating their previous mark-up estimate using a weighted average:
mit = βm̂it + (1− β)mi,t−1, (2)
where 0 < β ≤ 1. The smaller β is, the more gradual the price change is from year to year.
4.3. Customer’s Purchasing Decision Rule
At the start of year (t, t+ 1), all customers are therefore offered insurance at the price
Pit by insurer i. Customer j then calculates the total cost TCijt of buying insurance from
insurer i as follows:
TCijt = Pit + γ∆ij, (3)
where ∆ij represents the distance along the shorter arc from the customer’s location to the
insurer’s location on the circular landscape (Figure 3), and γ denotes a cost (or disutility)
per unit distance. A simple ranking algorithm is then used to assign customers to insurers,
based on the rule that customers wish to buy from the insurer with the lowest total cost.
How many policies an insurer can sell is determined by its current level of capital which
defines the maximum gross premium that the insurer can earn. If an insurer has more
bids than it can satisfy, the bidding customers are allocated to the insurer at random, and
customers who are not sold a policy then move on to their second-choice insurer etc., until
all customers have bought a policy.
During the year (t, t+1), claims are randomly generated and independent from customer
to customer. Claim amount (severity) is Gamma-distributed with mean µG and standard
17
Figure 4: An outline of the insurance agent-based model.
deviation σG. Claim frequency is given by a Bernoulli distribution with parameter b: see
Kaas et al. (2008, p. 32) and Hart et al. (2007, p. 130) for more details.
At the end of every year, the total claims paid out by insurers are added up, and
likewise for the total premiums received for the year. A loss ratio, the ratio of total claims
to total premiums over all the firms in the industry, is then calculated.




α 0.001 Risk loading factor in insurers’ premium calculation, eq. (1)
β 0.3 Weight in insurers’ mark-up calculation, eq. (2)
γ 0.08 Weight in customers’ total cost calculation, eq. (3)
M 1000 Number of customers
N 20 Number of insurers
T 1000 Time horizon of simulation
µG 100 Mean of Gamma-distributed i.i.d. claims
σG 10 Standard deviation of Gamma-distributed i.i.d. claims
b 1 Parameter of claim frequency distribution
w 0.2 Exponential smoothing parameter in insurer’s average claim size
z 0.2 Credibility factor in pure risk premium
Table 1: Parameter values in the agent-based model of the UK property insurance industry.
4.4. Parameterization
The parameter values for our agent-based model are given in Table 1. Numerical
experiments show that the three critical parameters which affect simulation results are
the first three parameters in Table 1. The other parameters produce little qualitative
difference in the results, except if they are assigned unrepresentative extreme values. These
parameter values are chosen so as to create a reasonable representation of the real-world
property insurance industry in the UK.
It is well known that the numbers N or M of agents is an important parameter in agent-
based simulation models. Gulya´s (2002) illustrates this graphically. We test the parameters
carefully making N and M large enough so that there is no noticeable quantization effect,
while keeping them small enough so that the simulations execute quickly. Experiments
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reveal that the random claims process parameters µG, σG, and b only affect the scale and
volatility of loss ratios on the simulated market. The values selected here are partly based
on the simulation study of Taylor (2008). We also use the 20/80 rule of thumb commonly
adopted for the actuarial costing parameters w and z (Booth et al., 2005; Kaas et al.,
2008). Sensitivity analysis shows that our results are robust to reasonable changes in these
parameter values.
Estimation of the critical parameters α, β and γ proceeds by the method of moments
combined with stochastic simulations of the agent-based model. Many such stochastic
simulations are performed on a grid of values in the α–β–γ parameter space. A grid search
is then carried out to match the mean, standard deviation and lag-1 autocorrelation of the
simulated loss ratios to the corresponding statistics from the actual loss ratios in the UK
property insurance data.10 The grid is then refined around the best triplet of parameter
values, simulations are performed again, and a further grid search is carried out.11 The
process is repeated until a reasonable degree of precision for the optimal estimates of α,
β and γ is achieved. To illustrate this, Figure 5 shows the variation, as the parameters β
and γ change, in the difference between the lag-1 autocorrelation on the actual data and
the lag-1 autocorrelation in model simulations.
10As usual in Monte-Carlo simulations, we fix the seed of the random number generator so that the
random claims made by customers are identical for every simulation carried out at each point in the grid.
This minimizes sampling error.
11Spot-checks on the grid are carried out by means of further simulations to check that we search for
global, not local, best estimates.
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Figure 5: Heatmap of the difference between the lag-1 autocorrelation on the actual data and the lag-1




According to Taber and Timpone (1996, p. 77), the internal validity of models is con-
cerned with whether a model gives a faithful representation of the underlying theory that
is being tested. They argue that it should be checked before other forms of validation are
attempted. The raison d’eˆtre of our agent-based model is to test the presumption that sim-
ple behavior within an insurance firm and interaction within the industry will consolidate
into an industry-wide cyclical dynamics. Our model does indeed impart simple behav-
ioral rules to underwriters through mark-up pricing in equation (1), to actuaries through
credibility-weighted costing of claims, and to customers through the total cost function of
price and distance in equation (3). There is no reason to believe that any of these rules, by
themselves, will generate cycles or crises. In addition, we are capturing the interaction be-
tween insurers and customers through insurers’ evaluation of customers’ price preferences
and through customers’ affinity for the insurance product (through the circular preference
space). Simple interaction between insurers themselves, through pooling of claims data,
is also modeled. Finally, actuaries and underwriters also interact within firms in their
respective roles of costing and pricing. It is true that we disregard operations managers
and claims adjusters, but their influence on insurance prices is less clear-cut. Our model
is therefore internally valid in the sense that several aspects of the behavioral theory that
we are testing are duly represented in the model.
Another aspect of internal validation is basic sensitivity analysis (Taber and Timpone,
1996, p. 78). When the number of customers M is increased, one would expect that the
insurance market becomes less competitive, and that insurers’ overall profitability increases.
Simulations indeed show that the mean industry-wide loss ratio in the model falls as M
increases. In fact, the volatility of the loss ratio also falls, since insurers find that demand
is less responsive to a price change and they do not have to compete on price aggressively.
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Conversely, we find that the mean and standard deviation of the loss ratio increase as
the number of insurers N increases, because competition intensifies. Increasing the mean
µG and standard deviation σG of claims should increase the mean and standard deviation
of the industry-wide loss ratio respectively, and this is also observed in our sensitivity
analysis. These results are intuitively correct and strengthen the internal validity of our
agent-based model.
It is also important to test that the model is reliable in the sense that model out-
put remains consistent over multiple runs in each stochastic simulation that we perform
(Bloomquist, 2006; Taber and Timpone, 1996, p. 78). First, we test, over several distinct
runs of the model, that loss ratios are stationary in the second-order stochastic sense.12
This is done by means of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. For virtually all simu-
lated sample paths that were tested, the ADF test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root
at the 5% significance level.13 Correlograms also show that autocorrelations decay rapidly
as lag increases. We conclude that the simulated loss ratios are indeed stationary. Next,
we check the ergodicity of the model by verifying that means and standard deviations of
the simulated loss ratio at a common time point over an ensemble of 1000 sample paths
is approximately equal to the means and standard deviations of loss ratio along one long
simulated sample path. Finally, we check that our estimates of mean and standard devi-
ation are stable over different lengths of simulation runs and also over different ensemble
sizes.14
12In all simulations, we discard the first 100 periods of the sample path to avoid transient behavior at
initialization. We also use the same pseudo-random sample of claims by fixing the seed of the random
number generator, so that results are comparable.
13For a small minority of runs, this rejection occurs at the 10% level.
14In other words, we check that sample statistics are stable when averaged over 1000 as well as 10000
runs, and also over a time horizon of 100 years as well as 1000 years.
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Figure 6: Empirical distribution functions of actual loss ratios (stepped line) from the UK property
insurance industry, and simulated loss ratios (smooth line) from the agent-based model.
5.2. Outcome Validation
Outcome validity is concerned with whether there is a good correspondence between
simulation outcomes and real-world data (Bloomquist, 2006; Taber and Timpone, 1996,
p. 75). Since we successfully tested for stationarity and we verified ergodicity in the internal
validation stage, we can compare the distribution of simulated loss ratios from the agent-
based model to the distribution in the actual data from the UK property insurance industry.
Figure 6 shows the empirical distribution functions from the simulated and actual loss
ratios: they are close although the simulated loss ratios appear to be less dispersed, and
very high insurer profitability (very low loss ratios) occur less frequently in our model than
in the real-world UK property insurance sector. A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the two distributions are the same, at the 5%
significance level. This confirms that our model has a good fit to the data.
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5.3. Process Validation
Whereas outcome validity is about the correspondence between simulation outcomes
and real-world data, process validity of models is about the correspondence between “a
model’s mechanisms and the real-world processes that produce the output” (Taber and
Timpone, 1996, p. 75). In our model, we attempt to reproduce the functions of rate-
making actuaries, by replicating actuarial practice (Booth et al., 2005; Hart et al., 2007)
while simultaneously conforming to actuarial theory (Kaas et al., 2008). The distinction
that we make in our model between actuarial rate-making and underwriter pricing functions
is realistic (Feldblum, 2001; Booth et al., 2005, p. 404).
The pricing rule which governs underwriters’ behavior in our model is based on cost-
plus pricing which is well-established in managerial economics (Hirschey and Pappas, 1996;
Petersen and Lewis, 1999) as well as in insurance: see Harrington and Niehaus (2003,
p. 137) or Hart et al. (2007, p. 455). It is regarded as a widely used heuristic by managers to
approximately maximize their firms’ expected profit (Conlisk, 1996; Baumol and Quandt,
1964). According to Drury and Tayles (2006), 60% of 112 firms that they surveyed in the
U.K. use this form of pricing.
The decision rule of customers in our model is also closer to reality than in most models
because it is a function of non-price characteristics and not just of price. Customers are
clearly influenced by characteristics such as the reputation of an insurer, the perceived
quality of service it provides, advertising methods etc. If they were not, then corporate
budgets spent on branding, advertising and customer relationship would not be as large
as they are. Although the circular preference space is abstract, it does capture customers’
decisions better than most conventional economic models which concentrate on price alone.
Many real-world processes in the insurance industry are therefore represented in our
model. Of course, these processes are simplified: complete process validity is both “im-
possible and undesirable” (Taber and Timpone, 1996, p. 73) and some tension between
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maintaining simplicity (or parsimony) and capturing the complex reality of social systems
is inevitable.
6. Main Result
The purpose of the agent-based simulation model described, parameterized and vali-
dated in the preceding sections is to assess the socio-anthropological and behavioral theories
of Ingram and Underwood (2010), Feldblum (2001) and Fitzpatrick (2004) concerning the
underwriting cycle and crises prevalent in the property-casualty insurance industry. More
specifically, the hypothesis that we seek to falsify with our model is that complex industry-
wide behavior (such as cycles) cannot be generated by simple behaviors at the firm level
and simple interaction between customers and players in the industry. If this hypothesis is
rejected, then our model will lend support to these theories, although no definitive proof
can be established either way.
The loss ratio from one simulation run of our model is shown in Figure 7. As in the
actual data from the UK property insurance sector in Figure 2, the regular ups and downs
suggest that cycles may be present. The sharp turning points can arguably be interpreted
as crises in the industry.
In order to test the presence of cycles, we use a similar approach to Venezian (1985),
Cummins and Outreville (1987), Harrington et al. (2014) and others in the insurance
literature, which is to fit a second-order autoregression, i.e. an AR(2) model (Box et al.,
1994), to the loss ratio. The loss ratio from the simulated model was found to be stationary
in the internal validation stage of the modeling process. The Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) takes a value of -2.2987 when an AR(2) model is fitted, compared with -2.2919 for
an AR(1) and -2.2972 for an AR(3), meaning that the AR(2) is the marginally preferred
model.
The fitted model is Πt = a0 + a1Πt−1 + a2Πt−2 + t, with a0 = 0.937, a1 = 0.467 and
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Figure 7: Plot of simulated loss ratio over time (years) for one simulation run of the agent-based model of
the UK property insurance sector.
a2 = −0.100. Here Πt denotes the loss ratio and t denotes the residuals. A condition for
stationary cycles to occur in an AR(2) model is that a1 > 0, −1 < a2 < 0 and a21 + 4a2 < 0
(Box et al., 1994, p. 60). This condition is satisfied in our model, thereby establishing the
presence of cycles.
The second-order autoregression above is not entirely satisfactory. First, it has a weak
fit to the data with an adjusted R2 of 0.19. Second, it is claimed that underwriting
cycles are not best described by autoregressive models (e.g. Boyer and Owadally, 2015).
However, further support for the existence of cycles can be obtained by spectral analysis.
Figure 8 shows the periodograms for the loss ratios from both the actual data on the UK
property insurance sector and from the simulated agent-based model. The single peak in
the periodograms, occurring at roughly the same annual frequency of 0.17, indicates that
a cycle occurs with a period of about 5.9 years in both the actual insurance data and in
the agent-based model. Although the above time series analysis pertains to only one sim-
ulation run, similar sample paths are generated every time that a simulation is performed,
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Figure 8: Smoothed periodograms (bandwidth = 0.060) of actual loss ratios for the UK property insurance
sector (top) and for the simulated loss ratios from the agent-based model (below).
with peaks and troughs occurring roughly 6 years apart, but not necessarily at the same
time points.
The presence of cycles in the simulation model, despite only simple individual-level
behavior and interaction, means that we reject the hypothesis that such simple behavior
cannot propagate and emerge as complex cyclical industry-wide behavior. The behavioral
and socio-anthropological theories furnished by Fitzpatrick (2004), Feldblum (2001), In-
gram and Bush (2013), Kunreuther et al. (2013) and Boyer et al. (2013) all rely on a
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transmission mechanism from simple individual-level behavior to complex macro-level be-
havior. Therefore, we cannot rule out that their explanations for cycles and crises in the
insurance industry are valid explanations.
7. Simulation Experiment
Agent-based models are, of course, ideal ‘sandboxes’ or experimental platforms. Virtual
‘what if’ experiments that cannot be performed in the real world can be carried out by
perturbing parameters, assumptions and initial conditions: see Taber and Timpone (1996,
p. 6), Axelrod (1997) and Lustick et al. (2004), among others.
We perform a simple experiment involving the relationship between actuaries and un-
derwriters in an insurance firm. Both the behavioral, fear-based explanation of Fitzpatrick
(2004) and the socio-anthropological explanation of Ingram and Underwood (2010), Ingram
et al. (2012) and Ingram and Bush (2013) suggest that competing influence and shifting
power between groups of individuals within the insurance firm can perpetuate underwriting
cycles in the insurance industry. In our model, the β parameter in equation (2) governs
the relationship between underwriters and actuaries. A high β means that underwriters
change prices more aggressively from year to year in response to what they perceive as
customer demand. The price will then deviate from the actuarial premium rate. In other
words, underwriters have more say in the price offered to customers than actuaries, as β
increases. On the other hand, a lower β gives greater power to actuaries over the insurance
price.
In Figure 9, we see that the volatility of the loss ratio increases as β increases (the
vertical scales in the 3 panels are different). The plural risk attitudes in the socio-
anthropological framework of Ingram and Bush (2013) do indeed transpire in our model:
actuaries, as prudent risk managers, dominate when β is low and dampen volatility in
the insurance industry; underwriters, as profit-maximizing risk-takers, dominate when β
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is high and create greater volatility.
Figure 10 shows various correlograms of loss ratio for different values of β. The loss ratio
become less autocorrelated, and more like a noisy random sequence, as β increases. Time
series features such as cycles, which arise from stochastic dependence, therefore disappear
when the moderating influence of actuaries on insurance prices wanes. Taken together,
these results suggest that underwriting cycles and insurance crises may well be a conse-
quence of the interplay between actuaries and underwriters (and possibly other groups)
within the insurance firm, as argued by Fitzpatrick (2004), Feldblum (2001), Ingram and
Underwood (2010) and Ingram and Bush (2013). The price for less volatile insurance
premiums in the short term may be greater cyclicality in the long term.
8. Conclusion
A stable and well-functioning insurance sector is vital to the socio-economic well-being
of individuals. Yet, the insurance industry is wracked by regular cycles and periodic crises.
Despite the efforts of industry regulators, consumer protection authorities and insurance
risk managers, underwriting cycles continue to cause violent swings in the prices paid by
insurance consumers. These cycles have a significant socio-economic cost as they damage
the protection required by individuals for their homes, belongings, and livelihoods, and also
affect companies who require insurance for their assets. An even greater cost is incurred
in the event of insurance crises, when the cycles plunge deeply and suddenly: insurance
cover can become scarce or exorbitantly expensive.
In this paper, we review new hypotheses put forward to explain underwriting cycles and
insurance crises: the socio-anthropological hypothesis of Ingram and Underwood (2010)
and Ingram and Bush (2013), and the behavioral hypotheses of Fitzpatrick (2004) and
Feldblum (2001), backed up by evidence supplied by behavioral economics applied to in-
surance.
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Figure 9: Time plots of simulated loss ratio for β = 0.2 (top panel), β = 0.4 (middle panel), β = 0.6
(bottom panel). The loss ratio becomes more volatile as β increases. (The vertical scales in the 3 panels
are different.)
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Figure 10: Correlograms of simulated loss ratio as β increases from 0.2 (top panel) to 1 (bottom panel).
The loss ratio becomes less autocorrelated and more like a noisy random sequence as β increases. Upper
and lower bounds at 5% significance level are also shown.
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There is an implicit presumption, in all of these hypotheses, that behavior and interac-
tion at the micro or individual scale can create complex effects on a macro or social scale.
We develop an agent-based simulation model, inspired by Axelrod (1997), Macal and North
(2010), Taber and Timpone (1996) and others, to investigate whether this presumption is
tenable. Our model is parameterized on actual data for the property insurance sector in
the UK. We assess our model rigorously for internal, outcome and process validity, and
document this carefully. The main result that we obtain, from stochastic simulations of
our model, is that cycles do seem to be present. This is confirmed by both time series and
spectral analyses of simulated loss ratios. Visual inspection of the simulation runs reveals
sharp turning points in the loss ratios, which are very suggestive of insurance crises.
These cycles and crises appear in the agent-based model even though the agents are
assigned simple realistic rules of behavior and interaction with one another. This in turn
means that we cannot rule out that individual-level behavior and interaction—as implied
by the social-anthropological and behavioral hypotheses of Ingram and Underwood (2010),
Fitzpatrick (2004) and Feldblum (2001)—may be a contributory factor to insurance indus-
try cycles and crises. In a further simulation experiment, we observe that the interplay
between, and countervailing influences of, underwriters and actuaries within the insurance
firm may also contribute to industry-wide cycles. There appears to be a tradeoff between
less volatile insurance premiums in the short term and greater cyclicality in the long term.
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